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Abstract
The authors build a theoretical model that generates demand for collateral by Large Value
Transfer System (LVTS) participants under the assumption that they minimize the cost of holding
and managing collateral for LVTS purposes. The model predicts that the optimal amount of
collateral held by each LVTS participant depends on the opportunity cost of collateral, the
transactions costs of acquiring assets used as collateral and transferring them in and out of the
LVTS, and the distribution of an LVTS participant’s payment ﬂows in the LVTS.
The authors conclude that the aggregate amount of collateral pledged to the LVTS is quite close to
that predicted by the model, when benchmark values are used for opportunity and transactions
costs that are based on anecdotal evidence, despite the fact that these costs are likely to vary among
participants. If one LVTS participant that appears to face a lower opportunity cost of collateral is
excluded from the analysis, the model predicts an aggregate level of collateral that is within 5 per
cent of the amount actually held by LVTS participants, on average, between February 1999 and
May 2003.
The authors also apply panel-data regressions to the level of collateral held in the LVTS. They
ﬁnd that the results are broadly supportive of the theoretical model. Sensitivity analysis of this
model indicates that, when the opportunity cost of collateral increases, the amount of collateral
that participants hold could be greatly reduced.
JEL classiﬁcation: E44, G21
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial institutions; Payments, clearing and settlements systemsvi
Résumé
Les auteures ont conçu un modèle théorique de génération de la demande de garantie à laquelle
devraient satisfaire les participants au Système de transfert de paiements de grande valeur
(STPGV) dans le contexte d’une minimisation des coûts de détention et de gestion des garanties
qu’ils doivent détenir dans le cadre de ce système. D’après le modèle, le montant optimal de
garantie de chaque participant est déterminé par trois facteurs : le coût d’opportunité des
garanties, les coûts de transaction liés à l’acquisition des actifs qui serviront de garantie et à leur
transfert dans le système et hors du système, et la distribution, à l’intérieur du système, des ﬂux de
paiements du participant.
Les auteures arrivent à la conclusion que le montant global des garanties constituées aux ﬁns du
STPGV est très proche de celui généré par le modèle lorsqu’on utilise, pour les coûts
d’opportunité et de transaction, des valeurs de référence reposant sur les observations recueillies,
bien que ces coûts soient susceptibles de varier d’un participant à l’autre. Si l’on exclut de
l’analyse un participant pour qui le coût d’opportunité des garanties semble moindre, le modèle
prédit un niveau global de garantie présentant un écart de moins de 5 % par rapport au montant
moyen effectivement détenu par les participants au STPGV entre février 1999 et mai 2003.
Les auteures ont également appliqué des régressions sur données de panel au volume des
garanties détenues au sein du STPGV. Les résultats qu’elles obtiennent corroborent largement le
modèle théorique. L’analyse de sensibilité du modèle indique que l’augmentation du coût
d’opportunité des garanties peut entraîner une forte réduction du montant des garanties détenues
par les participants.
Classiﬁcation JEL :  E44, G21
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Institutions ﬁnancières; Systèmes de paiement, de compensation et
de règlement1
1. Introduction
The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) is the Canadian payments system used to make large-
value or time-sensitive payments on a ﬁnal and irrevocable basis. Thirteen ﬁnancial institutions
(and the Bank of Canada) are direct LVTS participants. The LVTS requires these participants to
pledge collateral to facilitate the safe and continuous ﬂow of payments throughout the day and to
ensure that the LVTS can complete settlement at the end of the day.1
LVTS payments sent and received by each participant can vary signiﬁcantly from day to day, hour
to hour, and even minute to minute. Participants know in advance many of the payments they will
receive and be required to send. They cannot, however, always synchronize these ﬂows. They may
have to make large payments before they receive incoming funds, sometimes unexpectedly. A
buffer of collateral allows participants to accommodate such occurrences without impeding the
timely delivery of payments.2 On occasion, an LVTS participant may require an unusually large
advance at the end of the day from the Bank of Canada, perhaps because of an operational
problem. A buffer of collateral can also serve to back any large advances that may be required in
such a situation.
If an LVTS participant does not minimize the costs associated with holding and managing
collateral for LVTS purposes, excessive costs could be passed on to its clients, who could pay
more for sending LVTS payments than would be optimal. Clients, if deterred from sending
payments via the LVTS, may choose payment systems that are less well protected against
payment-system risk. A participant with a sufﬁcient buffer of collateral can also meet its clients’
payment needs on a more timely basis than a participant that has signiﬁcantly less collateral,
thereby providing a higher level of service to its clients. Clients of the second participant may
choose another ﬁnancial service provider.
If participants do not hold sufﬁcient collateral for LVTS purposes, an excessive number of
occasions might be expected where large-value, time-sensitive, or systemically important
payments would be delayed. This would disrupt payment systems and could inconvenience clients
of LVTS participants.
1. CollateralpledgedbyLVTSparticipantstotheBankofCanadaensuresthattheLVTScansettleatthe
end of the day even if any single participant defaults. In the extremely remote scenario of more than
one participant failing on the same day, and if collateral is insufﬁcient, the Bank guarantees that the
system will settle. For further information on the LVTS,see http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/
payments/systems.html#value.
2. See section 5.1 for a description of how the cost of collateral can differ for various assets that are
eligible as collateral in the LVTS, or for different ﬁnancial institutions.2
An interesting question is therefore whether participants pledge cost-minimizing levels of
collateral. This paper addresses that question by determining an average aggregate value for all
LVTS participants. In section 2, we brieﬂy describe how collateral requirements are determined in
the LVTS. In section 3, we provide some statistics on payments associated with the LVTS. In
section 4, we build a theoretical model that generates the demand for collateral by LVTS
participants under the assumption that they minimize the cost of collateral management. Our
fairly simple model predicts that the optimal amount of collateral held by each LVTS participant
depends on the opportunity cost of collateral, the transactions costs of acquiring assets eligible as
collateral and transferring them in and out of the LVTS, and the distribution of an LVTS
participant’s payment ﬂows in the LVTS. In section 5, we examine how to measure the variables
that affect the demand for collateral and use estimates for the cost of collateral and transactions
costs based on anecdotal evidence. In section 6, we apply our model to LVTS participants.
We conclude that our model, when we use these estimates of opportunity costs and transactions
costs, predicts aggregate collateral pledged to the LVTS quite well. When we exclude from our
analysis one LVTS participant that appears to face a lower opportunity cost of collateral, the
model predicts an aggregate level of collateral that is within 5 per cent of the amount pledged, on
average, by LVTS participants, despite the fact that opportunity and transactions costs may vary
considerably among LVTS participants.
In section 7, we apply panel-data regressions to explain the level of collateral pledged to the
LVTS, and ﬁnd that most parameters that describe the payments distribution are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant but economically small, as one would expect from our model. The
coefﬁcient on the opportunity cost of collateral is also statistically signiﬁcant and has a substantial
negative effect. This empirical conclusion is in line with our theoretical model. Sensitivity
analysis of our theoretical model indicates that, when we increase the cost of collateral, the
amount of collateral that participants hold will be greatly reduced.
An interesting extension of our research would be to apply extreme value theory (EVT) to our
model. Our data set includes almost 1,100 daily observations for each ﬁnancial institution, but
there are relatively few in the right-hand tail of the distribution associated with days on which
there are very large payments. EVT might allow greater precision regarding cost-minimizing
levels of collateral.
Our model assumes, based on anecdotal information, that the opportunity cost of collateral is
much higher when collateral must be obtained at short notice than when collateral is routinely
pledged to the LVTS. It would be useful to study why such a large gap exists, because the
difference between the ordinary cost of collateral and the price that must be paid when collateral3
is obtained at short notice is very important in explaining the optimal level of collateral in our
model.
Our model is quite simple. It assumes that collateral can always be immediately obtained at short
notice (i.e., stockouts do not occur), and that there is therefore no cost to LVTS participants of
delayed payments. In practice, if it takes time to obtain collateral needed to make unexpectedly
large payments during the day, participants could face ﬁnancial penalties or reputational damage
from delayed payments. These factors would tend to increase the demand for collateral beyond
what is predicted by our model. Incorporating these factors would make for a richer model.
2. A Brief Description of the LVTS
In the ﬁrst ﬁve months of 2003, an average of about 16,000 payments totalling about $125 billion
ﬂowed through the LVTS each day. The LVTS has two payment streams: Tranche 1 (T1) and
Tranche 2 (T2). T2 payments account for about 98 per cent of payment volumes and $110 billion
per day. T1 payments account for 2 per cent of volumes and about $15 billion in value.
T2 payments are viewed as being much “cheaper” than T1 payments, because the latter must be
backed dollar-for-dollar by T1 funds already received or by collateral. In contrast, each T2
payment does not have to be fully backed by collateral, but is largely supported by intraday credit.
Because T2 payments are cheaper, ﬁnancial institutions (FIs) make every effort to send payments
via T2. T1 payments tend to be reserved for payments that are too large to pass through T2 risk
controls, which derive from bilateral credit limits that participants extend to each other.
Because Tranche 2 uses collateral so efﬁciently, about $110 billion in payments can be supported
by only a few billion dollars of collateral. Each participant’s T2 collateral requirement (Max ASO)
is proportional to the largest bilateral credit limit extended. The aggregate Max ASO is very stable.
Hence, there is little need for FIs to hold a large buffer of collateral to support T2 payments. In the
remainder of this paper, we focus on T1 payment ﬂows.
T1 payments averaged $15 billion per day in the first five months of 2003. Of these, about $7 billion
were sent by FIs and the remainder were sent by the Bank of Canada. T1 payments sent by the
Bank are not collateralized and we do not consider these payments any further in this paper.
FIs may choose to allocate more than the required amount of collateral to the LVTS. Since
aggregate T2 collateral requirements rarely change signiﬁcantly, we remove the Max ASO from
our analysis of collateral and focus on the amount of collateral available to support T1 payments.4
Henceforth, reference to total collateral pledged to the LVTS will mean the amount of collateral
that is available to support T1 payments. We call this TC1:
,
where TC is total collateral pledged to the LVTS.
An FI must at all times during the day meet the constraint that sufﬁcient collateral is available to
meet net T1 payments sent:
,
where T1P and T1R represent T1 payments sent and received, respectively. If TC1 would
otherwise fall short, an FI must increase TC1 by pledging more collateral in the LVTS.
At any point in time, the total buffer of collateral available to an FI is therefore given by:
.
3. A Look at the Data on Payment Flows
Table 1 shows how T1P has varied since the LVTS began operations in February 1999.
                             *February to December 1999; **January to May 2003













2000 5.2 8.3 44 -39.7
2001 5.4 3.9 37 -15.9
2002 5.7 5.6 78 110.8
2003** 7.4 29.8 130 66.7
Average 5.7 72
TC1 TC Max ASO – =
TC1 T1PT 1R – ³
TC1 T1PT 1R – () –5
The average value of T1 payments sent by FIs was quite stable between 1999 and 2002, at close to
$5 billion. In 2003 (January to May), the value jumped to almost $7.5 billion, largely as a result of
T1 payments related to the settlement of foreign exchange transactions through the new CLS Bank.3
In aggregate, daily T1 payments sent by FIs are extremely volatile, with a standard deviation of
$3.5 billion. They are also highly skewed. This indicates that, on most days, payments sent sum to
relatively small amounts, but that on a smaller number of days they can be extremely large; for
example, at the end of the corporate tax reporting season. The volatility and skewness is
characteristic of individual FI payment distributions, as well as aggregate T1 payments.
4. A Model of the Demand for Collateral in the LVTS
Daily collateral management by LVTS participants involves making sure that the collateral
required to support T1 payments will be available promptly. For each FI, having sufﬁcient
collateral pledged to support LVTS payments is analogous to managing an inventory to meet
demand. Efﬁcient collateral management involves doing so at minimum cost.
This inventory management problem is similar to some models of money demand. One can think
of the demand for collateral as deriving from two sources: the transactions demand and the
precautionary demand.4 The transactions demand for collateral in the LVTS arises due to the lack
of synchronization between T1 payments and T1 receipts, both intraday and from day to day.5
Even if these payments and receipts were known with certainty, there would be a demand for a
buffer of collateral, because of the transactions costs of adding to collateral in the LVTS. The
demand for collateral in the LVTS would respond positively to the transactions costs, positively to
the costs of monitoring payments and collateral positions, and negatively to its opportunity cost
(i.e., the interest forgone by holding securities eligible as collateral in the LVTS, rather than
holding securities that yielded higher returns). We would expect the demand for collateral to
respond positively to some measure of the scale of payment ﬂows and to measures of the
dispersion of T1 payment ﬂows. The latter effect arises because, for a given buffer of collateral,
this dispersion would determine how frequently collateral would need to be moved into the LVTS
in order to meet T1 payment requirements.
3. For more on the CLS Bank, seeMiller and Northcott (2002). The CLS Bank began commercial
operations inSeptember 2002.
4. See Tsiang (1969, 114) for an analogous example.
5. ThereisanincentiveforparticipantstobringtheiroverallLVTSposition(T1+T2)closetozerobythe
timetheLVTSsettlesattheendoftheday.Becausethisaffectstheoverallposition,itshouldnothave
a large effect on daily T1 payments sent.6
Because of the uncertainty about the size and timing of T1 payments and receipts, there is a need
to hold a buffer of collateral for LVTS purposes to meet contingencies. This is the precautionary
demand. Maintaining a larger buffer of collateral has beneﬁts similar to those associated with the
transactions demand.6 It reduces expected transactions costs because it reduces the probability
that unexpectedly large payments will require additional collateral to be brought into the LVTS. It
reduces the likelihood that time-sensitive payments will be delayed if a considerable amount of
time is required to obtain collateral that can be moved into the LVTS. It also reduces the chance
that collateral will need to be obtained at premium prices if it is needed at short notice. Stated
another way, the optimal buffer of collateral, given the costs of managing collateral, reduces to an
acceptable level the probability of running out of it (and therefore of needing to bring more of it
into the LVTS); see Tsiang (1969). We expect the precautionary demand for collateral to respond
to the same variables and in the same direction as the transactions demand.
4.1 The simplest model
This model is very simple and is designed to be used for illustrative purposes, rather than as a true
representation of actual collateral management by LVTS participants. We assume that payments,
, have density function . Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical FI’s probability
distribution of payments. It reﬂects the highly skewed nature of FIs’ T1 payments distributions.
Each FI chooses an optimal “normal” level of collateral, , to hold for LVTS purposes, and pledges
this collateral to the Bank of Canada before the LVTS opens for processing payments. Normal
collateral is locked in for the day and it stays constant from one day to another. One dollar of
collateral has an opportunity cost of i per day. Daily T1P becomes known at the beginning of the
processing cycle for LVTS payments. If  is insufﬁcient to meet payments for the day, the FI
must convert higher-yielding securities to those eligible as collateral and bring additional
collateral into the LVTS to meet , when payments processing begins. We assume that it is
always possible for the FI to obtain sufﬁcient collateral to meet its payment needs. It returns the
level of collateral to its normal level at the end of the day. The transactions costs of acquiring
securities eligible as collateral and pledging them to the LVTS (and subsequently releasing the
pledge) is given by a, which is assumed to be independent of the value of the collateral increase.
The additional interest forgone when more collateral must be brought into the LVTS is i times the
value of the additional collateral.
The expected total cost, , of collateral is thus given by:
6. See Patinkin(1965), Miller and Orr (1966), Tsiang (1969), and Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980) for
analyses of related problems in the contextof the demand for money.






where is the proportion of days per year (or the probability each day) that > .
When this occurs, additional collateral of  must be brought into the LVTS and a
transactions fee must be paid.
The marginal cost equals:
. (2)





Equation (5) shows that there are both beneﬁts and costs to holding an additional dollar of normal
collateral. The beneﬁt is that the chance of having to incur a transactions cost of a is reduced by
. The cost is that, on some occasions when payments are less than normal collateral (this




     with . (7)
If the opportunity cost is greater than the ﬁxed cost, , then , since the cost of holding
any normal collateral exceeds the expected transactions costs of having to move collateral in and
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out of the LVTS. In such a case, collateral will be brought into the LVTS on a “just-in-time” basis
and will move one-for-one with payments. On the other hand, if i =0 , =max(T1P) and enough
normal collateral will be pledged to cover even the days with the largest T1 payments.
and  are determined by the distribution of . As Figure 1 makes clear, this
relationship will be affected by the shape of the payments distribution: its variance and its
skewness.
Figure 1: Total Collateral and the Distribution of T1P
ThesolidcurvedlineinFigure2showstheequilibriumrelationshipdeﬁnedby
in equation (6). An increase in i, or a decrease in a, requires an increase in  to restore
equilibrium. This requires a reduction in . When the distribution of payments has the skewed
shape typical of daily payments sent by LVTS participants, the shape of will be much like that
shown in Figure 2, although the degree of curvature of  will depend somewhat on the speciﬁc
parameters of each LVTS participant’s payments distribution.
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An increase in the mean of the payments distribution (given that its shape remains constant)
increases the normal level of collateral. An increase in the variance of payments increases ,
because it increases the chance for large payments and reduces the chance that the previous level
of collateral will be sufﬁcient to meet payments. Similarly, an increase in the skewness of the
payments distribution will increase .
It could be difﬁcult to identify the normal level of collateral in the data. Thus, we would like to
know the relationship between average collateral, , and average payments, . Average
payments are given by:
. (8)
Average collateral will equal:
. (9)
Thus, average collateral equals normal collateral plus the extra collateral that must be brought into
the LVTS whenever payments exceed normal collateral. Average collateral will also vary with
average payments. As before, an increase in the variance and skewness of payments will increase
average collateral.
Excess collateral is equal to  whenever  and equals zero when additional
collateral must be brought into the LVTS.7 The expected level of excess collateral is thus given
by:
(10)
       =
.
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Figure 2: Optimal Collateral Levels for Simple and Expanded Models
4.2 An extended model
The model presented in section 4.1 illustrates in a simple way the problem faced by each FI in
deciding how much collateral to pledge to support its LVTS payments; it is not meant to portray
the actual decision faced by LVTS participants. The model assumes that the opportunity cost of
acquiring collateral at short notice does not differ from i, the ongoing cost of holding a dollar of
normal collateral for LVTS purposes. This assumption is not realistic. The equilibrium condition
for a model that incorporates this additional factor is given by:
, (11)
where j can be thought of as the opportunity cost of collateral that must be obtained once
payments are known at the beginning of the day, if payments exceed normal collateral. The
additional third term on the right-hand side of (11) represents the savings associated with holding
an additional unit of normal collateral. This savings occurs because, on large payment days, that
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The ﬁrst-order condition becomes:
. (12)
The dotted line in Figure 2 graphs this relationship.
In section 6, we test this model to see how well it can explain average holdings of total collateral,
TC1, by FIs in the LVTS. First, however, we consider what measures are appropriate for deﬁning
the variables used in our model.
5. EmpiricalMeasuresoftheVariablesthatAffecttheDemandfor
Collateral
In assessing the costs of pledging collateral, one must consider what alternatives are available to
fund T1 payments. If using collateral is not the least-expensive method, other methods would be
chosen.
A participant could wait to receive T1 funds before making outgoing T1 payments. This would
not, however, be acceptable for time-sensitive payments. There may be considerable uncertainty
about the value and timing of incoming T1 funds. Moreover, delaying payments imposes a cost on
other FIs, because their T1 receipts would be delayed. This might delay their own payment
outﬂows, thus leading to a more generalized slowdown or gridlock in the payments system.
Hence, to deter this behaviour, LVTS rules require that participants send certain proportions of
daily payments by various times during the day.8
A participant could borrow, buy, or swap T1 funds (for T2 funds) from another FI and use the
proceeds to fund T1 payments. This would not require any increase in TC1. There is little
indication, however, that any signiﬁcant intraday market for T1 funds currently exists.
To increase its collateral, an FI could pledge additional securities to the LVTS that it already
owns, or it could buy or borrow securities on the market that it could use to increase TC1.
5.1 The opportunity cost of holding collateral
We deﬁne this to equal the spread between the rate of return on assets pledged as collateral and
the rate of return on assets that would be held in the absence of collateral requirements in the
LVTS. As a result, the opportunity cost of collateral could differ across ﬁnancial institutions.
According to this deﬁnition, if for whatever reason an FI chooses to hold the securities pledged to
8. This rule, however, applies to total LVTS payments sent, not to T1 payments.
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the LVTS on its books even if the LVTS has no collateral requirements, this collateral has an
opportunity cost of zero.
Another deﬁnition sometimes used is that the cost of collateral equals the difference between the
rate of return on securities pledged as collateral and a bank’s funding costs. This assumes that a
bank expands its balance sheet to acquire assets used as collateral. If one uses banker’s
acceptances (BAs) as a measure of a bank’s funding costs and the rate of return on treasury bills
as the rate of return on assets pledged as collateral, estimates made a number of years ago put the
cost of collateral at 10 to 15 basis points. Recent estimates suggest that this cost has recently
fallen, perhaps to as low as 5 basis points.
In November 2001, the list of securities eligible as collateral for the LVTS was expanded at the
request of FIs. Eligible collateral now includes corporate debt and many other securities in
addition to traditionally used sources of collateral, such as Government of Canada debt. If FIs
pledge securities to the LVTS from the expanded list that they were already willing to hold on
their balance sheets, the opportunity cost of this new collateral is zero. On the other hand, if they
choose to expand their balance sheets to acquire newly eligible securities, most acquired
securities from the expanded list will attract a capital charge. This collateral will therefore have a
small opportunity cost. Thus, an estimate of 5 basis points appears to be a reasonable current
estimate of the cost of collateral, although it may ﬂuctuate among different FIs.
If an FI needs to buy or borrow large values of securities on the market at very short notice, a premium
opportunity cost is probably involved. Some anecdotal evidence puts this cost at more than 40 basis
points. Estimates of 5 basis points for normal collateral, and 43 basis points for collateral that is
obtained at short notice, will be used as a benchmark in applying our model.
5.2 Monitoring and transactions costs
More active collateral management involves more frequent moves of collateral into and out of the
LVTS, so that collateral can be put to higher-yielding uses. It also involves greater transactions
costs and requires greater monitoring effort.
Monitoring costs include the value of time and the expertise required to ensure that sufﬁcient
collateral is available to support T1 payments. This involves forecasting intraday and day-to-day
T1 positions so that it is known ahead of time when additional collateral will be required. It also
involves real-time monitoring of an FI’s collateral buffer to ensure that errors in forecasting
payments do not prevent payments from ﬂowing as required. The greater the buffer of collateral
that is normally pledged to the LVTS, the less effort is necessary for developing accurate13
forecasts, and the less actively collateral and net T1 positions must be monitored. Most of these
costs may be ﬁxed costs, but there may also be an element of variable cost related to monitoring
effort. Unfortunately, no data on monitoring costs are available; therefore, we cannot incorporate
this effect into our model.
Transactions costs include the cost of moving collateral into and out of the LVTS. We deﬁne them
here to also include the transaction cost (but not the interest cost) of buying or borrowing
securities on the market and pledging them to the LVTS. For most LVTS participants, pledging
securities to the LVTS that are already owned can be done quickly. In addition to the transactions
costs associated with buying or borrowing securities, there would also be a component of
transactions costs that are internal to the FI. The relevant transaction cost would be the sum of
these factors. In our base case, we use anecdotal information to estimate a fee of $80 for a “round-
trip” transaction; that is, for obtaining and pledging securities to the LVTS and subsequently
releasing the pledge.
5.3 The distribution of T1 payment ﬂows
Although our model explains quite clearly the relationship between the distribution of payments
and optimal levels of collateral, several additional points should be made.
Our theoretical model focuses on T1P as the determinant of collateral demand in the LVTS. But,
as noted in section 2, it is in fact the peak intraday net payments sent that generate daily collateral
requirements. On an intraday basis, FIs that receive T1 funds before they need to make T1
payments may need little collateral. Receipts, however, tend to be less predictable than payments
sent, especially T1 receipts from other FIs based on client activity. Many T1 payments, a large
proportion of which ﬂow to the Bank of Canada, must be made at ﬁxed points during the day.
Daily T1P represents the maximum possible daily collateral requirement. The question as to
whether FIs focus more on T1 payments or projected peak net T1 payments in determining their
daily collateral holdings can be answered by examining how well our model, based on T1P (rather
than net payments), performs. In any case, in the absence of data on intraday net T1 positions, we
rely on daily T1P.
Many T1 payments sent to and from the Bank are time-sensitive. The Bank of Canada is the
banker for the Government of Canada, for the securities settlement system called CDSX, and for
the CLS Bank. It is also the settlement agent for the ACSS and the LVTS.9 Most payments and
9. The Automated Clearing Settlement System (ACSS) is used mostly for retail payments. For
descriptions of all these systems, see the Bank of Canada’s Web site at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/
en/payments/mainpage.html.14
receipts associated with these functions (as well as others) are due at speciﬁc times during the day
and are made with T1 funds. Participants cannot delay making payments to the Bank even if T1
funds are expected to be received from the Bank later in the day.
The model that we outlined in section 4 assumes that FIs do not know the value of payments that
they will send each day until after they have pledged some collateral, but they know the
distribution that each day’s payments is drawn from. While cash managers at FIs forecast
aggregate payment ﬂows, there will always be residual uncertainty regarding the size of daily T1
payments activity.
Our model also assumes that knowledge of yesterday’s payment values does not help forecast
today’s payments—more broadly, that daily payments are identically and independently
distributed.10 This is not likely to be strictly accurate. However, there is little ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation in FIs’ payments distributions, so this seems to be a reasonable approximation.
6. Applying the Model to the LVTS
The model that we developed in section 4 explains the demand for collateral (TC1) for each FI on
the basis of three factors: opportunity costs, transactions costs, and the distribution of T1 payment
ﬂows. In this section, we apply the model to each FI to calculate its optimal level of TC1. Then,
we sum across all FIs to determine the predicted level of aggregate collateral pledged to the
LVTS, and determine how close this is to actual average collateral.11
Predictions from the model are ﬁrst calculated under the assumption that no premium is
associated with collateral that is obtained at short notice. It is clear, however, that the model will
greatly underpredict actual levels of collateral.
Next, we consider our base case, where i = 5 basis points and j = 43 basis points.12 For the
transactions costs associated with acquiring and pledging collateral (and later releasing the
pledge), we use $80, the estimate outlined earlier. This is the relevant relationship for our
extended model that assumes a premium cost is associated with collateral that is obtained at short
notice. We ﬁnd that actual collateral is quite a bit greater than predicted collateral. As noted
above, however, FIs may face different costs of collateral. If we exclude one FI that appears to
face a lower cost of collateral, predicted collateral is within 5 per cent of actual.
10. This means that an FI faces exactly the same payments distribution each day.
11. Data on FIs’ payments and collateral are conﬁdential.
12. In applying the model, these annual ratesare converted to daily rates.15
To gauge the sensitivity of the results to the values taken by opportunity and transactions costs,
several alternative values for these parameters are chosen. First, we consider the effect of halving
the transactions cost, from $80 to $40. This generates two opposing effects, as shown in Figure 2:
it shifts up the horizontal line given by  , which tends to reduce the demand for collateral, but it
also shifts up the dashed curve, which tends to increase the demand for collateral. With our data
set, the two effects are almost offsetting and there is only a small decrease in the optimal level of
collateral.
We then consider the effect of increasing both the normal cost of collateral, i, and the premium
cost of collateral, j, by 5 basis points. This shifts up the  line in Figure 2, which tends to reduce
the demand for collateral and has no effect on the dotted curve. In our data set, the effect on
aggregate collateral is large: the average level of collateral would be expected to fall by almost 20 per
cent.
Leaving the cost of normal collateral at 10 basis points, we consider the effect of reducing the
premium cost of collateral by 5 basis points to 43 basis points. This leaves the  line in Figure 2
unchanged and shifts down the dotted line, which tends to reduce the demand for collateral. In
aggregate, however, the effect is small, because the demand for collateral falls by only about 3 per
cent.
To summarize, our benchmark parameters (i = 5 basis points; j = 43 basis points; a = $80) suggest
that, when we take into account one FI that appears to face a lower cost of collateral, the aggregate
level of collateral predicted by our model is close to the actual level of collateral. This indicates
that, in aggregate and on balance, there is little evidence of “excess” (from an economic
perspective) collateral in the LVTS.
We also calculate optimal coverage ratios associated with our predictions of collateral. For an
individual FI, the coverage ratio indicates the per cent of days (or probability each day) that the
optimal level of normal collateral, , is sufﬁcient to cover T1P. The aggregate coverage ratio is
calculated by averaging the coverage ratios of individual FIs. The aggregate ratio is just over 90 per
cent in the base case, indicating that (according to our model), about 10 per cent of the time, FIs
would need to bring additional collateral into the LVTS. Thus, if collateral is difﬁcult to obtain at
very short notice and if FIs are surprised on those days by having to make large payments, one
might expect to see a certain amount of operational disruption and delay in making some











7. Analysis Using Panel-Data Regressions of DailyTC1
The previous analysis used a static approach to determine the optimal level of collateral held by
FIs. That approach is unable to explain how the demand for collateral has evolved over time in
response to changes in the opportunity cost of collateral and FIs’ payment distributions. In this
section, we examine this issue using ﬁxed-effects panel-data regressions for the 13 LVTS
participants over the period 4 February 1999 to 31 May 2003.13
In line with our theoretical model, we regress TC1 on T1P, the variance of T1P, the skewness of
T1P, and the opportunity cost of collateral.14 Since we have no data that capture how the premium
cost of collateral and transactions costs vary over time, these variables cannot be included in our
regressions. We use a moving 30-day backward window of the variance and skewness of T1P. Our
opportunity cost of collateral is based on the spread between 30- or 90-day BAs and treasury bills.
After November 2001, when the list of eligible securities for use as collateral in the LVTS was
expanded, we take the opportunity cost of collateral to be 5 basis points, in line with the
discussion in section 5. The ﬁxed effects that capture institution-speciﬁc unobservable variables
are incorporated by including dummy variables in the equations for each FI.
We expect TC1 to respond positively to increases in T1P, and to the variance and skewness of T1P.
To the extent that the coverage ratio is high, however, we would expect to see a very small
coefﬁcient on T1P (see section 6). A high coverage ratio indicates that, on most occasions, FIs
have sufﬁcient collateral to meet daily payment ﬂows and do not have to alter TC1. We would
expect TC1 to respond negatively to the opportunity cost.
The panel-data regressions are estimated using the following equations:
Ln(TC1it) = b0i*Di + b1*Ln(T1Pit) + b2*Ln(varT1Pit ) + b3*(skT1Pit) + b4*(OppCost30t) + eit, (13)
Ln(TC1it) = b0i*Di + b1*Ln(T1Pit) + b2*Ln(varT1Pit ) + b3*(skT1Pit) + b4*(OppCost90t) + eit, (14)
where Di represents the institution-speciﬁc dummy variables.
The Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2002) tests indicate no evidence of unit roots in our residuals.
Breutsch-Pagan tests indicate heteroscedasticity, however, and standard errors are therefore
13. We exclude that part of the sample associated withY2K effects beginning 1 October 1999 and ending
28 February 2000.
14. TC1,T1P, and the variance ofT1Pare expressed innatural logarithms.17
corrected for this effect. The residuals are found to be non-normal. To determine appropriate
signiﬁcance levels, therefore, the distributions of the t-statistics are bootstrapped.
The p-levels are shown in brackets under each estimated coefﬁcient in Table 2. The table shows
small but statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on T1P distribution regressors (T1P, and the variance
of T1P). The skewness measure is not statistically signiﬁcant and is dropped from the regressions.
The coefﬁcients on the two yield-spread measures are negative, as expected. The coefﬁcient on
the 90-day spread is almost twice the size of that on the 30-day spread. The coefﬁcient estimates
found on both 30- and 90-day opportunity costs result in a fairly large dollar-value change in
aggregate TC1. For instance, if TC1 is $10 billion, an increase of 5 basis points in the opportunity
cost, as measured by the 30-day spread, would reduce TC1 by about $300 million. If we apply the
same calculation using the 90-day opportunity cost, TC1 would fall by about $550 million. TC1
therefore appears to be sensitive to the cost of collateral.
The small but signiﬁcant parameter estimates on T1P and its variance are consistent with the
theoretical model, which suggests that FIs would be expected to hold sufﬁcient collateral on a
routine basis to cover their payments about 90 per cent of the time. FIs allow for only a small
probability of having to increase their total collateral.
Overall, these panel-data regression results are roughly consistent with the predictions made by
our theoretical model.





















The simple theoretical model that we have developed in this paper appears to explain quite well
the amount of collateral pledged to the LVTS, despite the fact that opportunity costs and
transactions costs faced by individual LVTS participants may differ from the benchmark values
that we use for those parameters. When we exclude one LVTS participant that appears to face a
lower cost of collateral, our model indicates that the actual level of collateral held by FIs is within
5 per cent of the actual level.
Thus, our model suggests that there is little evidence that clients of FIs would be deterred from
using the LVTS because FIs passed on to them costs associated with excessive levels of collateral.
Our model indicates that the aggregate coverage ratio is about 90 per cent, so that, in aggregate,
about 10 per cent of the time, FIs would need to increase TC1 to meet days with very large T1
payments. One might therefore expect to see some occasions when time-sensitive or systemically
important payments are delayed as FIs try, on very short notice, to meet unexpectedly large
payments; however, those occasions should be rare.
In the empirical part of our paper, we use panel-data regressions to model the demand for
collateral as a function of its opportunity cost and measures of an institution’s payments
distribution, such as level, variance, and skewness. We ﬁnd that these regressions are broadly
supportive of our theoretical model with small but statistically signiﬁcant effects for the level and
variance (but not the skewness) of an FI’s T1 payments, and with statistically signiﬁcant and
negative effects for the opportunity cost of collateral.
This study suggests several areas for future work. First, in relation to the application of our
theoretical model, the use of extreme value theory might strengthen our results. Although we have
more than 1,100 observations per FI in our sample, relatively few of these lie in the tail of the
payments distribution. Second, more information and a greater understanding of the opportunity
costs associated with collateral that is obtained at very short notice would be helpful, because the
difference between this cost and the cost of normal collateral is important in explaining the
predictions of our model. Finally, our model assumes that FIs can always obtain collateral at short
notice, so that stockouts do not occur and payments are not delayed. In practice, if it takes time to
obtain collateral needed to make unexpectedly large payments during the day, participants could
face ﬁnancial penalties or reputational damage from delayed payments. These factors would tend
to increase the demand for collateral beyond what is predicted by our model. Incorporating these
factors would provide a richer model.19
Bibliography
Baltagi, B.H. 1995. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. West Sussex, England: John Wiley &
Sons Ltd.
Baumol, W.J. 1952. “The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 66(4): 545–56.
Freedman, C. 1999. The Regulation of Central Securities Depositories and the Linkages between
CSDs and Large-Value Payment Systems. Technical Report No. 87. Ottawa: Bank of Can-
ada.
Frenkel, J.A. and B. Jovanovic. 1980. “On Transactions and Precautionary Demand for Money.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 95(1): 25–43.
Im, K.S., M.H. Pesaran, and Y. Shin. 2002. “Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels.”
Department of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
MacKinnon, J.G. 2002. “Bootstrap Inference in Econometrics.” Canadian Journal of Economics
35(4): 615–45.
Miller, P. and C.A. Northcott. 2002. “CLS Bank: Managing Foreign Exchange Settlement Risk.”
Bank of Canada Review (Autumn): 13–25.
Miller, M.H. and D. Orr. 1966. “A Model of the Demand for Money by Firms.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 80(3): 413–35.
Patinkin, D. 1965. Money, Interest and Prices. 2nd edition. New York: Harper & Row.
Phillips, P.C.B. 1987. “Time Series Regression with a Unit Root.” Econometrica 55(2): 277–301.
Phillips, P.C.B. and P. Perron. 1988. “Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression.” Biomet-
rica 75(2): 335–46.
Schwert, G.W. 1989. “Tests for Unit Roots: A Monte Carlo Investigation.” Journal of Business
and Economic Statistics 7: 147–59.
Tobin, J. 1956. “The Interest-elasticity of Transactions Demand for Cash.” The Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 38(3): 241–47.
Tsiang, S.C. 1969. “The Precautionary Demand for Money: An Inventory Theoretical Analysis.”
The Journal of Political Economy 77(1): 99–117.Bank of Canada Working Papers
Documents de travail de la Banque du Canada
Working papers are generally published in the language of the author, with an abstract in both ofﬁcial
languages. Les documents de travail sont publiés généralement dans la langue utilisée par les auteurs; ils sont
cependant précédés d’un résumé bilingue.
Copies and a complete list of working papers are available from:
Pour obtenir des exemplaires et une liste complète des documents de travail, prière de s’adresser à :
Publications Distribution, Bank of Canada Diffusion des publications, Banque du Canada
234 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario  K1A 0G9 234, rue Wellington, Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0G9
E-mail: publications@bankofcanada.ca  Adresse électronique : publications@banqueducanada.ca
Web site: http://www.bankofcanada.ca Site Web : http://www.banqueducanada.ca
2003
2003-35 Real Exchange Rate Persistence in Dynamic
General-Equilibrium Sticky-Price Models: An
Analytical Characterization H. Bouakez
2003-34 Governance and Financial Fragility: Evidence from
a Cross-Section of Countries M. Francis
2003-33 Do Peer Group Members Outperform Individual
Borrowers? A Test of Peer Group Lending Using
Canadian Micro-Credit Data R. Gomez and E. Santor
2003-32 The Canadian Phillips Curve and Regime Shifting F. Demers
2003-31 A Simple Test of Simple Rules: Can They Improve How
Monetary Policy is Implemented with Inﬂation Targets? N. Rowe and D. Tulk
2003-30 Are Wealth Effects Important for Canada? L. Pichette and D. Tremblay
2003-29 Nominal Rigidities and Exchange Rate Pass-Through
in a Structural Model of a Small Open Economy S. Ambler, A. Dib, and N. Rebei
2003-28 An Empirical Analysis of Liquidity and Order
Flow in the Brokered Interdealer Market for
Government of Canada Bonds C. D’Souza, C. Gaa, and J. Yang
2003-27 Monetary Policy in Estimated Models of Small
Open and Closed Economies A. Dib
2003-26 Measuring Interest Rate Expectations in Canada G. Johnson
2003-25 Income Trusts—Understanding the Issues M.R. King
2003-24 Forecasting and Analyzing World Commodity Prices R. Lalonde, Z. Zhu, and F. Demers
2003-23 What Does the Risk-Appetite Index Measure? M. Misina
2003-22 The Construction of Continuity-Adjusted
Monetary Aggregate Components J. Kottaras
2003-21 Dynamic Factor Analysis for Measuring Money P.D. Gilbert and L. Pichette
2003-20 The U.S. Stock Market and Fundamentals: A
Historical Decomposition D. Dupuis and D. Tessier